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Transparency is often uncritically considered a pre-requisite to accountability within the ISDS system, without much discussion directed to how transparency is instrumental to achieving such accountability. Yet, transparency is generally thought to be the golden bullet for effecting social transformation as well as considerations of the public interest in investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). This article aims at fostering deeper and more critical debate on the notion of transparency; in order to better understand both the ways in which it could be conceived for the purposes of transformation of the ISDS system and the extent to which international investment law and global administrative law (GAL), is a useful concept for this purpose. This paper considers the ways in which the legislative and policy framework governing transparency creates the conditions whereby state and investors utilize the language and practice of transparency as a selflegitimising tool through its claim to accountability. This is further tested against choices made by state institutions and the ISDS system itself for the alluring concept of voluntary disclosures with no enforcement mechanisms-an intellectual contradiction. In response to this quandary, this paper aims at addressing some of the theoretical gaps identified above, particularly by examining the conceptual understandings of transparency, the current state of transparency in the ISDS system and the role of GAL in revamping the system. 1 These rules were created in order to resolve disputes between parties about contractual matters using the principles of commercial arbitration with modifications due to one party being a public entity. 2 The process is driven by the parties who can appoint the arbitrators and agree on the applicable law. 3 ISDS is often the subject of much criticism regarding the legitimacy of the system, pro-investor bias, broad investor rights and conflicting interpretation of these rights. This cumulatively brings the suitability of the arbitration system into question especially when the scope of state powers and public interest is at stake. 4 As a result, some states have withdrawn from investment treaties because of these problems. 5 Various solutions have been proffered to address these problems with transparency occupying a prominent position.
In recent times, there have been significant advances in the application of transparency measures in ISDS. These developments are good and welcome. In this article, I will discuss the current state of transparency measures and the recent advances. I will argue that the recent advances in transparency would be enriched through the global administrative law (GAL) approach and that the GAL approach would allow for further advances.
The call for transparency in the ISDS process has dominated the debate of academics and policy makers. In contributing to this debate, the questions I hope to answer in this article in terms of the further advances that the GAL approach can information be disclosed, who should be the recipients of the information? These considerations are significant and expected to shape the discourse regarding public interest considerations in ISDS through the application of GAL.
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF TRANSPARENCY
The notion of transparency as a means of improving ISDS to ensure greater legitimacy and credibility of the process is one of the outcomes of GAL to ensure accountability of global governance institutions to the broader public. The various debates in favour of transparency and the measures to improve the system through new rules of transparency that are being adopted by various investment dispute bodies all point to the undeniable fact that transparency is recognised as a measure that improves ISDS as a tool for good governance and should not be resisted. 6 What the notion of transparency means has been explored in various studies and in this article, I evaluate the various forms with the objective of identifying a suitable transparency framework that can serve as a model for various dispute resolution bodies in the context of ISDS.
Transparency is becoming a field of knowledge on its own and the genesis of transparency is often traced to the work on information asymmetries which stated that the supply and demand of information was necessary for the efficiency of markets.
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With the political and economic changes globally, transparency began to find a new meaning and globalisation as well as technology began to erode secrecy as an ideology in the mid-1990s. 8 Globalisation, transnational forms of governance and the growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are some of the drivers of transparency.
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Chayes and Chayes define transparency as the availability and accessibility of knowledge and information about the meaning of norms, rules, and procedures established by the treaty and practice of the regime, and the policies and activities of parties to the treaty and of any central organs of the regime as to matters relevant to treaty compliance and regime efficacy. 10 Zoellner argues that it is apparent then that transparency requires accessibility and clarity not only with regard to a legal regime's public interest issues while on the other side are the players who include the members of the arbitration panel and treaty drafters who use their ability to influence the development of the investment regime. The relations between these players within the investment regime are crucial and also discussed.
Transparency has been explored in various forms. Hood explores it as a doctrine of 'good governance,' 15 while it has also been explored as the 'power of information '. 16 In whatever light transparency has been explored, transparency has often been seen as a solution to problems that flourish under the shroud of secrecy, it is a powerful concept often invoked as the all-encompassing solution to demands of accountability. Firstly, the accuracy and completeness of information should be ensured to make the available information devoid of manipulation to suit the purposes of the discloser of the information. Reliance on the information should lead to the user of such information being able to draw accurate conclusions from the information received.
Secondly, the verifiability of the information should be possible if the accuracy of the information can be trusted. This is necessary for the optimal usefulness of the information to the recipient. Thirdly, easy accessibility of the information should be available which means inherent in transparency standards and implementation should be adequate records keeping and management, the development of appropriate rules of disclosure that will not unduly restrict the disclosure of public interest information.
Fourthly, in terms of procedure, the release of the information should be affordable to the public and such information release should not be hindered by procedural constraints that will delay the release of the information as information delayed may in some cases be information denied.
These four features are necessary and must be present for the optimisation of transparency. If information is only accurate and complete without regard for the degree of accessibility and the timeliness of the release, then while such information is highly useful in terms of its quality, it does little to advance transparency. Where information is released timely and at an affordable rate without regard for the accuracy of the information released, the quality of information is low and the appearance of transparency is merely created.
Transparency is significant for public participation; hence, GAL justifies greater transparency. This is the argument advanced under GAL as it calls for public participation as a tool for accountability. To ensure such participation takes place, the presence of transparency needs to exist on three levels. These are transparency of the The regime of international investment law is very fluid. There are numerous applicable investment treaties with similar principles in appearance but different in substance. Different arbitration systems have jurisdiction over these documents and they interpret these documents differently resulting in a vast range of jurisprudence. The ICSID and the UNCITRAL are the primary investment dispute bodies to be considered in this article because they handle the majority of BIT disputes. evaluates the current state of transparency and confidentiality in ISDS, and the recent developments in promoting the transparency agenda.
CURRENT STATE OF TRANSPARENCY IN ISDS
In the amended UNCITRAL arbitration rules in 2010, article 34(5) provides that 'an award may be made public with the consent of all parties or where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority.' This rule makes it possible for states to release awards that have been requested in terms of its freedom of information laws without violating the desires of private parties involved. This is consistent with Zoellner's concept of transparency discussed above relating to underlying obligations international law places on a state's internal legal regimes and procedures. The amended UNCITRAL rules allow the application of domestic laws without contravening international obligations.
The UNCITRAL rules were reviewed further in 2013 and the rules discussed below will be applicable from April 2014. Article 1 (3) (b) provides that the arbitral tribunal shall have the power…to adapt the requirements of any specific provision…to the particular circumstances of the case, after consultation with the disputing parties, … to conduct the arbitration in a practical manner and is consistent with the transparency objective of these Rules.
The articles goes further to grant discretion and authority to the tribunal and provides in article 1 (4)-(6) that in exercising discretion, the tribunal shall consider 'the public interest in transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and the disputing parties' interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.' The rules do not preclude the exercise of other powers that promote transparency such as accepting submissions from third parties. Article 1 (7)- (8) also provides that the rules of transparency trump any other arbitration rules that may conflict with it though provisions of the treaty and any other law applicable to arbitration which disputing parties cannot derogate from trumps the transparency rules.
These articles establishes the default rule that for ISDS under investment treaties which are concluded after these rules come into effect and are to be resolved under UNCITRAL, the transparency rules will apply. They recognise the principle of the public interest, limit the ability of states to evade application of the rules; however, they preserve the superiority of the treaty rules. This is significant and discussed later.
Article 3 provides for mandatory and automatic disclosure of information, mandatory disclosure when a request is made and disclosure of documents through the discretion of the tribunal. 34 Article 6 requires open hearings provided confidential information can be protected, the 'integrity of the arbitral processes' is protected and it does not affect logistics. provide for in terms of privacy and confidentiality is considered below.
3.1.Current state of Rules of Privacy and Confidentiality in ICSID and UNCITRAL
ISDS is governed by contract principles which, from a business perspective, are crucial to the resolution of disputes. 36 It has also been argued that the public also has a legitimate interest in investor protection and ISDS which will encourage cross-border investment by depoliticising state-party investment disputes.
37 34 (1) Subject to article 7, the following documents shall be made available to the public: the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defence and any further written statements or written submissions by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written submissions by the non-disputing Party(ies) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal. (2) Subject to article 7, expert reports and witness statements, exclusive of the exhibits thereto, shall be made available to the public, upon request by any person to the arbitral tribunal. (3) Subject to article 7, the arbitral tribunal may decide, on its own initiative or upon request from any person, and after consultation with the disputing parties, whether and how to make available exhibits and any other documents provided to, or issued by, the arbitral tribunal not falling within paragraphs 1 or 2 above. This may include, for example, making such documents available at a specified site. 35 (1.) Subject to article 6, paragraphs 2 and 3, hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument ('hearings') shall be public. (2.) Where there is a need to protect confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process pursuant to article 7, the arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such protection. 46 Article 7 provides that 'confidential or protected information consists of (a) confidential business information; (b) information that is protected against being made available to the public under the treaty; (c) information that is protected against being made available to the public, in the case of the information of the respondent, under the law of the respondent, and in the case of other information, under any law or rules determined by the arbitral tribunal to be applicable to the disclosure of such information; or (d) information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement. (3.) The arbitral tribunal, after consultation with the disputing parties, shall make arrangements to prevent any confidential or protected information from being made available to the public including by putting in place, as appropriate: (a) time limits in which a disputing party, non-disputing Party to the treaty, or third person shall give notice that it seeks protection for such information in documents; (b) procedures for the prompt designation and redaction of the particular confidential or protected information in such documents; and (c) procedures for holding hearings in private to the extent required by article 6, paragraph 2. Any determination as to whether information is confidential or protected shall be made by the arbitral tribunal after consultation with the disputing parties. (4.) Where the arbitral tribunal determines that information should not be redacted from a document, or that a document should not be prevented from being made available to the public, any disputing party, non-disputing Party to the treaty or third person that voluntarily introduced These rules allow the redaction of confidential information in documents that are subject to the exceptions and prevent the blanket refusal of information subject to the exceptions. Importantly, these exceptions defer to the applicable confidential rules of the treaty or the domestic rules of a state. Treaty rules must therefore not be unduly restrictive if the approach through which transparency of ISDS can be achieved in UNCITRAL will be realised. States in negotiating their treaties would have to include provisions directly in their investment treaties, making transparency obligatory.
Transparency can be introduced in two ways. It can be introduced as a requirement in the investment treaty on which the arbitration is based and it can also be introduced into the arbitration rules. Both mechanisms have been used by states in order to promote transparency in the ISDS process. I advocate the former position to avoid
and override many problems that may be encountered in the current arbitration rules or the applicability of any future amendments. In addition, by introducing transparency norm in the treaty itself, there is a greater opportunity for public participation.
Introducing transparency provisions in the drafting of investment treaties will be a significant development. It will also overcome the ability of states to bypass the newly developed UNCITRAL rules where the treaty rules prevail over the application of the transparency rules. Reliance will no longer be placed on arbitration rules as the only applicable rules for transparency in dispute resolution. An example of this is the NAFTA rule that allowed the publication of awards where the dispute is between the USA and Canada by the parties without the consent of the other party, a clear contrast to the UNCITRAL rules prior to its 2013 amendment.
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The NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued an interpretation of chapter 11 dealing with dispute settlement that 'nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to Chapter Eleven arbitration.' It also allows documents submitted to the tribunal to be publicly released but allows a redaction of confidential information, or information protected from disclosure under the party's domestic law or which must be withheld in compliance with relevant applicable arbitral rules. This interpretation gives unilateral powers to parties in the disclosure of documents.
the document into the record shall be permitted to withdraw all or part of the document from the record of the arbitral proceedings. 47 Article 1137. specifically provides that 'nothing in this section requires a respondent to withhold from the public information required to be disclosed by its laws.'
The CAFTA-DR agreement recognises the need to balance domestic and international law, hence the need for sub-section 5. It also means that the decision of a tribunal is not final and binding as the laws and court decisions of a state can overrule the decision of a tribunal. The CAFTA-DR provides that a disputing party must identify a particular reason why information must be restricted and there remains an obligation to publish a redacted version of that information.
48 "1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4, the respondent shall, after receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to the non-disputing Parties and make them available to the public: (a) the notice of intent; (b) the notice of arbitration; (c) pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant to Article 10.20.2 and 10.20.3 and Article 10.25; (d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and (e) orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal. 3. Nothing in this Section requires a respondent to disclose protected information or to furnish or allow access to information that it may withhold in accordance with Article 21.2 (Essential Security) or Article 21.5 (Disclosure of Information). 4. Any protected information that is submitted to the tribunal shall be protected from disclosure in accordance with the following procedures: (a) Subject to subparagraph (d), neither the disputing parties nor the tribunal shall disclose to any nondisputing Party or to the public any protected information where the disputing party that provided the information clearly designates it in accordance with subparagraph (b); (b) Any disputing party claiming that certain information constitutes protected information shall clearly designate the information at the time it is submitted to the tribunal; (c) A disputing party shall, at the same time that it submits a document containing information claimed to be protected information, submit a redacted version of the document that does not contain the information. Only the redacted version shall be provided to the non-disputing Parties and made public in accordance with paragraph 1; and (d) The tribunal shall decide any objection regarding the designation of information claimed to be protected information. If the tribunal determines that such information was not properly designated, the disputing party that submitted the information may (i) Withdraw all or part of its submission containing such information, or (ii) agree to resubmit complete and redacted documents with corrected designations in accordance with the tribunal's determination and subparagraph (c). In either case, the other disputing party shall, whenever necessary, resubmit complete and redacted documents which either remove the information withdrawn under (i) by the disputing party that first submitted the information or re-designate the information consistent with the designation under (ii) of the disputing party that first submitted the information. there is a growing concern for transparency in contract negotiation that many developing countries and international organizations are now responding to.
Indeed, many now see this as one of the most important ingredients in the fight against corruption. This article sets out the principle of transparency and an expectation that both investors and governments will act on this expectation.
Thirdly, the model BIT provides in article 24 that state parties shall make available to an investor, all laws and regulations including policies and administrative guidelines that may affect the investments of investors.
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If the approach suggested in this section is followed, it will address the question of obligations international law places on a state's internal legal regimes and procedures and the relations between institutions and regimes of international law and member states mentioned earlier.
A state party will be in the position to establish the supremacy of its internal access to information laws in these disputes and ensure that no conflict of interest arises when a state is obliged to release information to the public and also comply with a confidentiality order of a tribunal.
In South Africa, where there is a constitutional guarantee of the right of access to information, the model in the NAFTA and CAFTA-DR agreements that allows access to information based on the domestic laws of a state will allow a treaty party to ensure the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights when negotiating treaties and infuse transparency into the arbitration process. of GAL which creates the opportunity for further advances for the improvement of transparency mechanisms.
NEGOTIATING TRANSPARENCY FOR ISDS: APPLYING GAL
Magraw and Amerasinghe in 'Transparency and Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration' start by discussing the power shifts in investor-state arbitration relevant to transparency and public participation. 54 They state that investment protection laws have shifted power from the state to investors and secondly, they argue that power has shifted from the public to the state because there has been a decrease in holding states accountable to citizens due to the use of the traditionally non-transparent arbitration tribunals.
55
Transparency increases the quality of decision making because in instances where awards are published for public scrutiny, there is a greater pressure on arbitrators to write well-reasoned decisions. 56 The public scrutiny of the arbitration process also authority from the treaty parties. Hoexter defines administrative law as the regulation of activities of bodies that exercise public powers or performs public functions, irrespective of whether those bodies are public authorities in a strict sense.
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Administrative acts can be legislative or adjudicative and in the context of ISDS, the act is adjudicative. Adjudicative judicial administrative acts concern the resolution of disputes by an authority. These bodies are in most cases specialised and more interventionist than courts; their decisions have prospective effect and bind large administrative hierarchies; they are not dogged by cumbersome procedural rules of courts and the doctrine of precedent and are consequently more flexible and can operate at a greater speed. 65 To determine whether an act is administrative, the factors considered include the nature of the power, the source of the power, its subject matter, whether it involves the performance of a public duty, how closely it involves the implementation of legislation or the making of policy in the broad sense.
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Applying these factors, there can be little doubt that ISDS tribunals exercise the substantive and procedural power delegated to them from the states that concluded the BIT under which the applicable dispute arose. Since the nature of the power is delegated, the source comes from sovereign states. The subject matter can be of a public nature although it reflects a state descending into the commercial arena but the performance is adjudicative which is a public duty and closely involves the implementation of a treaty and pronouncing on the policy of a state. There are five substantive principles of GAL that are necessary for consideration in advancing this argument.
The principle of lawfulness requires that the administrative authorities should base their decisions in law and the content should comply with the law. 67 It also requires that the functions and powers of administrative authorities should be validly enacted and sufficiently clear and specific. 68 Among the general principles of lawfulness is that nobody may at the same time be judge and party in a dispute. 69 Conformity with the aim of BITs ensures that ISDS tribunals exercise their powers solely for the purposes for which they exist and do not step outside the delegated authority. This is in line with the common law principle of ultra vires. 73 To ensure that this conformity exists, the principle of objectivity and impartiality by arbitrators is also a relevant consideration and rules guiding the promotion of these principles must be enacted.
The principle of nemo iudex in sua causa is the rule against bias based on two common law principles of good administration. Firstly, decisions are more likely to be sound when the decision-maker is unbiased. Secondly, the public will have more faith in the administrative process when justice is not only done but seen to be done. The report recognised the emergence of transparency in ISDS as a result of the increasing emphasis on the public interest inherent within investor-state disputes which involves public service sectors, the possible involvement of broader human rights concerns, the determination of large damages awarded against host states which are funded by public money, the presence of a state in the arbitration which triggers good governance obligations, the threat of arbitration from an investor having a 'chilling' effect on government policy and the growing appreciation of the impact of procedural matters in ISDS. 81 Another central concern is how lack of sufficient access to information of arbitration claims and disputes can affect sustainable development objectives. implementation. 89 The UNCTAD report also recognises the fact that GAL is concerned with principles of transparency, public participation, and due process, but argues that 'the application of the "global administrative law" label could potentially impede transparency reforms…as it is arguably harder to criticise a system once it has been framed as the embodiment of the rule of law.'
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It is difficult to understand why a reference to transparency as part of the rule of law will affect transparency reforms as the report suggests. As argued earlier, existing ISDS awards already recognise the importance of administrative law principles such as good faith, reasonableness, due process of law, non-discrimination, transparency as well as the public purpose and policy powers of states to introduce measures that affect public interests. The argument for the application of GAL is to deal with the application of transparency norms in a holistic and coordinated form that encourages arbitrators to apply GAL principles to improve the system and does not preclude the possibility of criticising or improving the system where a deficit still exists. The definition of GAL includes the opportunity for a review of decisions that are made which currently does not exist in ISDS. By suggesting that GAL principles should be applied by the system, the adoption of these rules are not recommended to be applied in a rigid and formalistic way that will not allow for future reforms that will further advance transparency. One of the outcomes of GAL is the right to appeal to another authority for the review of decisions. Where the opportunity for the comprehensive reform of the arbitration system arises in the future, the adoption of this outcome is welcome.
The UNCTAD report suggests a number of provisions that can be introduced into investment agreements that can bolster transparency. In recommending the increased availability of documents and information, access to oral hearings and amicus submissions, the report recognises the arguments against these measures which include increased cost to the disputing parties, the greater administrative burden and the potential for confidential information to be compromised. 91 The report recommends various formulations for future incorporation which I support because it recognises the principle of public participation that I promote in this article and sets out minimum sets of documents that constitute a binding obligation on the parties and the tribunal to release to the public. The transparency approach adopted by the UNCTAD is developed Where BITs contain detailed provisions to govern arbitration alongside mechanisms for access to information, public participation and amicus submissions such as the above, this provides a guiding rule for arbitrators to convene arbitration and ensure public participation and transparency of the process.
CONCLUSION
For transparency, there are areas in the domestic law of states that have direct implications for BITs and ISDS. For example, the recognition of the right to access information as a human right is significant for ISDS given the private nature of ISDS that excludes certain transparency norms. 92 Despite the pessimistic portrayal of the lack of transparency within the investment regime in the discourse of the current ISDS rules in this article, there are certain areas which can largely be regarded as transparent in terms of the knowledge and information disclosure surrounding them. These areas include the applicable rules that guide the arbitration procedure and the content of BITs to the extent that they are publicly available. This is an important aspect of the GAL approach. There are however other forms of information and knowledge that should be freely available but are not. 93 These include the fact that not all BITs in existence are 92 The right of access to information has attained universal recognition with several regional human rights treaties upholding the recognition of this right as well as regional courts such as the Inter-American and the European Courts recognising this right as well as its linkage to other rights. known and the magnitude of the regime cannot be fully determined. 94 Also, just as the number of BITs is unknown, so also are the number of arbitration disputes and the resulting awards since not all dispute resolution bodies are obliged to disclose the existence of all disputes before them. 95 For the disputes that are in the public domain, not all information pertaining to the disputes is currently disclosed.
96
It is obvious that not all information can be made freely available upon demand.
Legitimate commercial interests of investors and certain state information are usual exemptions to public information disclosure. 97 Consistent with the argument in this paper for a hybrid application of domestic and international law in ISDS, the right of access information is now firmly embedded as a human right including in South Africa with domestic legislation giving effect to this right. Therefore, ISDS tribunals should begin to recognise that the principle of confidentiality should no longer be treated as an absolute rule and disclosures should not be left to the discretion of the parties. South
Africa's access to information law recognises confidentiality of commercial information as well as a duty to protect confidentiality owed to a party in terms of an agreement such as in BITs as an exemption to disclosure of information. (April 2015) <http://www.iareporter.com/articles/arbitrators-interpret-bit-arbitration-clause-narrowly-a yet-to-be-published investment treaty award relating to the Servier v Poland case. The government had raised Article 32.5 of the UNCITRAL rules to prevent disclosure of the award which provided that awards can only be released subject to the consent of the parties. 101 The court held, however, that the award was public information and the respondent who had received the information request was a public authority bound by the freedom of information law.
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The parties themselves benefit from the transparency of certain areas to aid their cases. Where awards are published and interpretation of substantive principles are subject to scrutiny, disputing parties can benefit from ways on how they should approach their particular dispute and anticipate the outcomes of disputes. As a result, as a starting point, disputing parties should not unduly withhold their consent where necessary in disclosing information regarding their dispute.
The principles that I suggest here help to refine GAL and extend its application further in international investment law. If the substantive principles proposed are adopted, this would significantly improve the legitimacy of ISDS.
and-point-to-australia-as-example-of-state-not-viewing-investor-state-arbitration-as-essential-toinvestment-protection/> 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid.
